(originally published by H-German on 30 March 1997)
When writing about relations between Franco's Spain and Hitler's Germany, historians of the Spanish Civil War must navigate between two false alternatives: either asserting that the Nationalist movement was little more than a Nazi satellite, or insisting that the Franco regime owed little of its military victory in 1939 and subsequent political structure to direct German military aid and political tutelage.
Christian Leitz, in his article "Hermann Göring and Nazi Germany's Economic Exploitation of Nationalist Spain," has avoided both of these traps, instead using an analysis of a central player in the Hispano-German relationship as a tool for a deeper examination of the economic links between the two nations. Through the use of German and British primary documents, as well as the most important secondary sources, Leitz has produced a substantial and interesting article which sheds light on important aspects of Nazi economic policies, Hispano-German relations, and the nature of the Third Reich.
Leitz argues that, while Hermann Göring was initially a reluctant supporter of German intervention in the Spanish Civil War in July 1936, once Nazi aircraft and military supplies began to flow to Franco's forces, the Luftwaffe chief and head of the German Four-Year Plan organization quickly put himself at the center of German efforts to gain control of the Spanish economy. Until mid-1939, Göring dominated Hispano-German economic relations, attempting to pull Spain into the New Order as a source for raw materials and a market for German exports.
While Göring's aim was "to mould the Spanish economy into a useful dependent of Nazi Germany" (21), he failed in this endeavor. Leitz demonstrates clearly how Franco's unwillingness to completely subordinate his fledgling state to Nazi economic interests, the preexisting dominance of British and French mining and financial strength, and, most importantly, the arrival of the Second World War in September 1939, prevented the plans of Hitler's lieutenant from coming to fruition.
In his effort to extend German control over strategic elements of the Spanish economy, Göring made use of several innovative institutions and methods to secure access to Spanish and Moroccan iron ores, mercury, tungsten and other materials. Chief among these were the Spanish-based HISMA (Sociedad Hispano-Marroqui de Transportes) and the German-based ROWAK (Rohstoff-Waren-Kompensation Handelsgesellschaft) companies, German-controlled organizations which monopolized trade, including shipments of military equipment, between Nationalist-occupied territory and the Third Reich. The creation of these corporations not only allowed Göring a strong measure of influence over the Spanish government, but also, through this "system prevented any direct contact between companies in Germany and customers in Nationalist Spain, and vice-versa" (27) -- a clear indication of the autarkic direction in which the Four-Year Plan organization was pushing the German economy.
Göring's efforts and the monopolistic operation of HISMA/ROWAK, as Leitz points out, were also emblematic of the increasing politicization of German economic policy. In collaboration with Deputy Führer Rudolf Hess, Göring staffed HISMA and ROWAK with political functionaries, rather than with bankers or trade experts.
In the short run, as Leitz illustrates, Göring achieved dramatic success. At the end of the Spanish Civil War in April 1939, it appeared as if Spain were under the economic dominance of Germany. On paper at least, the Third Reich enjoyed an enviable treaty relationship with the Franco regime, had extracted extensive mining concessions and, unlike its potential rivals for influence in Spain, had vigorously backed the winning side of the Civil War.
Even as the Third Reich seemed at the height of economic influence in Spain, the Germans lost the game. While Hitler had supplied indispensable economic and military assistance to Franco during the Civil War, at the war's end France, Great Britain, and even the United States were far better positioned to extend credits and favorable trade terms to Spain. Once World War II began with the Nazi attack on Poland in September 1939, geographic difficulties also intervened to prevent Göring from consolidating his tenuous hold on the Spanish economy. Finally, Göring's own brazenness in asserting German economic interests in Spain hardly endeared him to Franco who, in an emblematic snub of no little diplomatic significance, refused to meet with the Luftwaffe chief in May 1939, even as the Nazi leader waited offshore in his private yacht.
Leitz's main contribution in this article is to demonstrate the extent to which Hermann Göring, one of Hitler's most important satraps, dominated the Hispano-German economic relationship during the Spanish Civil War. He also points out that Germany's failure to play a controlling role in the Spanish economy after 1939 can be attributed in large measure to Göring, the titular and actual manager of the Third Reich's efforts to prepare for war. It seems as if even Göring recognized his dismal record in regards to Spain, for after the summer of 1939 he played no role in subsequent Nazi dealings with that Iberian nation.
Göring failed in his efforts to draw Spain into Germany's economic orbit, but this defeat was not an isolated one. The history of Hispano-German relations during the Spanish Civil War and World War II is full of similar accounts, from Ribbentrop's inability to gain Spanish adhesion to the Tripartite Pact to Hitler's 1940 botched effort at Hendaye to nudge Franco into belligerency. Christian Leitz's analysis of Göring adds another piece to the puzzle of the Third Reich, contributing to the ongoing efforts of historians to explain how Nazi leaders, as determined as they were to achieve total victory, could accumulate such an abysmal record of humiliating defeats on all fronts, even in the years of their greatest power.
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